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Abstract— Traceability systems are information tools 
implemented within and between firms in food chains to 
improve  logistics  and  transparency  or  to  reduce  total 
food  safety  damage  costs.  Information  about  location 
and  condition  of  products  is  critical  when  food  safety 
incidents arise. This paper uses a principal-agent model 
to  investigate  the  optimal  choice  of  voluntary 
traceability  in  terms  of  precision  of  information  on  a 
given attribute at each link of a food chain. The results 
suggest that four scenarios may emerge for the supply 
chain depending on the costs of a system and whether or 
not  the  industry  can  internalize  total  food  safety 
damages: no traceability, traceability for one link, equal 
traceability for all links, or different positive traceability 
levels across all links. 
Keywords— Traceability, food safety, principal-agent 
model  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Traceability  systems  were  first  and  voluntarily 
introduced  in  food  supply  chains  in  the  late  1980s 
when  the  international  traceability  standard  NF  EN 
ISO  8402  was  issued  [1].  Initially  traceability  was 
conceived as part of a quality assurance system and 
intended  to  facilitate  effective  information 
management. Traceability can also be envisioned as a 
food safety risk management tool [2], as it can record 
information  on  attributes  of  a  product  and  may 
establish  a  relation  between  inputs  and  outputs, 
different  agents  in  the  food  chain,  and  events  in 
production  processes.  A  critical  issue  is  the 
appropriate  level  of  information  in  traceability,  who 
determines it, and who governs it.  
This paper investigates optimal levels of traceability 
at  different  stages  of  food  chains  as  endogenous 
choices.  Previous  literature  has  analyzed  how 
exogenous  levels  of  traceability  impact  liability  and 
incentives for food quality and safety [3], incentives 
for  anonymity  [4],  inspection  policies  [5],  or  total 
costs of a food recall [6].  
Traceability is but one of many tools firms have to 
manage  food  safety.  In  its  essence  a  traceability 
system is merely an information management tool and 
is only useful if data therein is relevant, reliable, and 
readily  accessible.  To  develop  and  implement 
traceability  requires  leadership  and  coordination 
among  partners  in  a  supply  chain.  Special  types  of 
governance structures may have to be created to assure 
that  the  level  of  traceability  provided  by  each  firm 
corresponds to the optimal level of traceability for the 
whole supply chain. Failure to coordinate the amount 
of  information  in  traceability  systems  may  lead  to 
disruptions and impede an effective response to a food 
safety incident. 
Traceability  systems  can  potentially  be  used  as  a 
tool to prevent food safety incidents (i.e., as an ex-ante 
food  safety  system).  In  practice,  most  systems  only 
react to an  existing  occurrence and thus are  ex-post 
means of mitigating the total potential damages of an 
accidental  or  intentional  safety  failure.  This  paper 
provides  insight  into  the  impact  of  traceability  by 
analysing the choice of traceable information through 
a principal-agent model.  
The paper is organized as follows: the next section 
reviews  previous  work  on  traceability  systems  and 
voluntary and mandatory approaches to the mitigation 
of food safety risks. The following section models the 
choice of traceability. The fourth section analysis and 
discusses the model. The final section concludes and 
suggests future research. 
II. TRACEABILITY AND FOOD SAFETY 
Information is a key element of competitiveness in 
food markets; it is also an element of food quality and 
its availability is vital to manage food crises. However 
information is an elusive concept, it must be related to 
something (for example, an attribute of a product, a 
production  process,  or  a  cost).  Moreover  it  must  be 
defined, it has to be identified, collected, analyzed and    
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communicated if it is to have any impact. A number of 
tools (for example the internet) enable easy and almost 
instantaneous  assess  to  all  sorts  of  information,  yet 
vital  pieces  of  information  may  not  be  freely 
accessible.  This  includes  information  on  safety 
attributes of foods such as the level of pathogens in 
milk entering a cheese manufacturing plant or the type 
of pesticides used to spray a vegetable crop. 
Traceability  systems  are  information  management 
tools  with  a  particular  feature:  they  enable  the 
identification of the path of a product along each stage 
of the supply chain [7],[8]. In recent years a number of 
studies  analysed  the  supply  and  demand  for 
traceability in food and feedstuffs. Golan et al. (2004) 
studied  food  traceability  systems  in  the  US, 
developing a framework to analyse  whether  existing 
systems  deliver an  efficient  level  of traceability and 
how  a  regulator  may  induce  the  socially  optimum 
level [8]. They classify systems in terms of depth (how 
far  back  or  forward  the  system  tracks  relevant 
information),  breadth  (how  much  information  is 
available) and precision (the detail and accuracy of the 
information).  Golan  et  al.  (2004)  found  that  each 
industry had a different efficient level of traceability. 
However,  they  could  not  assure  that  the  system  in 
place  provided  the  socially  optimal  level  of 
traceability in terms of quick response to food safety 
hazards. This paper draws on the framework proposed 
by  Golan’s  et  al.  (2004)  to  classify  traceability 
systems  proposing  a  model  for  the  choice  of 
traceability in terms of depth and precision.  
In  a  recent  paper,  Starbird  and  Amanor-Boadu 
(2007)  propose  a  principal-agent  model  where 
traceability  is  an  exogenous  variable  impacting  the 
nature of contractual relations between agents in the 
supply chain [9].  More specifically a monopsonistic 
buyer, with imperfect information on its input safety 
levels,  has  to  design  a  set  of  contracts  for  its 
heterogeneous potential suppliers. The contracts offer 
a bid price related to the contamination rate of food. 
Traceability is an exogenous factor that decreases the 
levels of information asymmetry and permits a shift of 
the  costs  of  food  safety  damages  to  the  source  of 
contamination [9]. This paper relates to our approach 
in that it uses agency theory to model the governance 
of  a  food  chain.  However,  rather  than  using 
traceability  as  a  parameter  we  model  it  as  an 
endogenous variable. 
Pouliot and Sumner (2008) investigate traceability 
in the context of food safety [3]. They offer a stylized 
model  of  a  supply  chain  composed  of  farmers, 
marketers and consumers, where traceability is not a 
choice  variable  but  is  linked  to  food  safety  and 
liability as it enables the identification of the source of 
system failures and improves liability attribution [3]. 
They conclude that when traceability is not available 
firms  are  anonymous  and  may  free-ride  on  the 
producers of safer food. This work proposes a formal 
model of the supply of safe food by different players 
in a supply chain. In [3] the model treats traceability as 
an  exogenous  probability  of  identifying  a  source. 
Overall, previous research on the economics of food 
traceability  has  not  analyzed  the  choice  of  optimal 
traceability levels by firms and/or regulators in food 
chains. 
III. MODELLING VOLUNTARY ADOPTION 
OF TRACEABILITY 
Traceability can be defined as a flow of information 
on product attributes and processes between players in 
a  supply  chain.  One  must  distinguish  a  traceability 
system from traceable information; the former refers 
to  the  process  and  structure  (for  example  computer 
hardware and software) through which information is 
shared  along  links  between  firms  in  a  food  chain. 
Traceable information is what is flowing through these 
links.  Different  factors  determine  the  level  of 
complexity  of  a  traceability  system:  the  number  of 
existing nodes and links, traceability levels, traceable 
units, and the governance structures.  
Following  [8],  we  define  traceable  information  in 
three  dimensions:  depth  (the  number  of  links  for 
which it is available), breadth (the number of attributes 
covered), and precision (the detail and accuracy of the 
information).  Denote  γij  as  the  level  of  precise 
traceable information for attribute j on link i. Assume 
that precision varies between zero and one, the later 
being maximum precision. For example, a traceability 
system for pork may track information on Salmonella 
and  E.  coli  (j=2),  between  farms,  feedlots, 
slaughterhouses,  and  retailers  (3  links,  i=3),  with  a    
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Farm  Processor 
Retailer 
level of precision such that each cut of meat can be 
traced to an individual animal.  
Consider  the  development  of  a  voluntary 
traceability system for a food supply chain where three 
representative  firms  are  linked  vertically.  Further 
suppose this stylized supply chain represents an entire 
industry,  composed  of  farmers,  processors  and 
distributors.  Following  [10]  and  [11],  retailers  are 
supply chain leaders in the provision of food safety. 
We present a model in which a downstream principal 
(the  retailer)  defines  the  level  of  traceability  each 
agent upstream in the chain will have to provide. An 
appropriate  framework  to  analyse  the  design  of 
voluntary  or  private  traceability  systems  (and 
mandatory  or  regulatory  systems,  as  well)  is  the 
principal-agent model. 
A. Model 
Suppose  a  monopsonist  retailer  aims  to  design  a 
voluntary traceability system requiring its suppliers to 
provide  a  traceability  level  to  mitigate  ex  post  food 
safety damage costs. Assume further that only one of 
the product’s attribute is traceable (say origin), thus it 
is not necessary to use the subscript (j) identifying the 
attribute.  Both  the  principal  (the  retailer)  and  the 
agents (the farmer and the processor) are risk neutral. 
The problem  of the  decision  maker is to induce the 
optimal level of traceability from each link in the food 
chain (γ1 from farm to processor and γ2 from processor 
to  retailer).  Figure  1  shows  a  representation  of  the 
supply chain. Where the dash arrows denote product 
flow and bold ones the information flow. Assume that 
if traceability is implemented information can flow up 
and  downstream  at  the  same  cost,  allowing  the 
identification  of  origin  and  destiny  of  products  to 
which it relates. Only the farm and processing plant 
provide  information  to  the  system.  The  retailer 







Figure 1: A stylized food chain traceability system 
The retailer  has perfect  insight  into the  costs and 
actions  of  agents  and  contracts  the  levels  of 
traceability  from  the  farm  or  the  processor 
independently. The task of the retailer is to design the 
least  costly  compensation  scheme  (bi  (i=1,  2))  to 
induce the farmer and the processor to provide a level 
of traceability (γi) that decreases the total damages (D) 
caused  by  a  food  contaminant  (e.g.,  Salmonella), 
occurring  with  exogenous  probability  (ψ).  The  total 
damage  cost  of  a  food  incident  is  a  decreasing  and 
convex function  of upstream traceability levels. The 
subscript  i  is  used  throughout  to  identify  the  link 
between the farmer and the processor (i=1) or between 
the processor and the retailer (i=2).  Assume that as 
precision  decreases  to  zero,  information  becomes 
useless,  i.e.,  when  γi=0  there  is  no  traceability.  The 
problem of the retailer is to minimize its total expected 
costs (E[TCr]) written as: 
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  Where  ci(i=1,2)  are  the  increasing  and  convex 
costs  of  traceability  incurred  by  farmer  and  retailer. 
The first two constraints are the individual rationality 
or participation constraints: the farmer and processor 
accept a contract to provide traceability insofar as its 
payoff is it least as large as their respective reservation 
utilities,  assumed  to  be  zero.  The  third  and  fourth 
inequalities are the incentive compatibility constraints; 
they guarantee that both farmer and processor offer the 
level  of  traceability  required  by  the  retailer  to 
minimize its total costs. 
The retailer is better off the larger the savings from 
the  compensation  paid  for  having  traceability.  The 
participation  constraints  are  binding  as  the  principal 
has  no  motive  to  offer  more  compensation  than  is 
necessary for the agents to accept a contract. Focusing 
for  now  on  the  conditions  to  accept  a  contract  and 
recalling  the  assumption  of  full  information,  we 
substitute the individual rationality constraints into the 
objective function in (1) to yield:    
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  Differentiating with respect to γ1 and γ2 the retailer 
determines the optimal levels of traceability required 
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Where  Dyi  is  the  partial  first  derivative  of  the 
damage function with respect to the traceability level 
of  agent  i,  and  ci’  denotes  the  marginal  costs  of 
traceability.  Given  the  assumptions  on  food  safety 
damage  costs  and  traceability  cost  functions,  the 
determinant  of  the  Hessian  matrix  below  is  positive 
and therefore the sufficient condition is met: 
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  By  the  implicit  function  theorem,  the  system  of 
equations (3) defines the optimal levels of voluntary 
traceability  required  from  the  farmer  and  the 
processor.  These  are  found  where  the  marginal 
reduction  of  expected  ex  post  food  safety  damages 
from traceability equals the marginal cost level.  
Denote the optimal levels of traceability by yi
* and 
the corresponding expected damages as D* = ψD(y1
*, 
y2
*). The retailer must design a compensation scheme 
that guarantees the provision of these optimal levels of 
traceability  by  upstream  agents.  From  the  incentive 
compatibility  constraints,  we  know  that  both  farmer 
and processor will choose yi
* if and only if it provides 
them  more  utility  than  they  receive  choosing  any 
alternative  traceability  level.  The  payment  scheme 
below is sufficient to assure both participation and that 
the  optimal  level  of  traceability  requested  by  the 
retailer is chosen by both farmer and processor: 
* *
* ( )   if   
( )  (i=1,2)                        (5)
  0      otherw ise








We  note  that  there  are  many  other  alternative 
payment schemes, for example one with the residual 
claimancy solution, where the principal would assume 
a fixed amount of the damages and shift the remaining 
part upstream. This was the payment suggested in [9] 
though in a slightly different context. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A number of cases emerge when determining which 
level  of  traceability  each  agent  upstream  has  to 
provide. We follow a benefit-cost analysis framework. 
Traceability will not be imposed if its costs are larger 
than the benefits from damage mitigation. Traceability 
is feasible if benefits outweigh costs for at least one 
link  in  the  supply  chain.  Before  proceeding  with  a 
detailed analysis, figure 2 provides initial intuition on 
the  determinants  of  the  decision.  The  figure  is 
constructed  fixing  the  level  of  traceability  from  the 
processor  and  focusing  on  the  choice  of  voluntary 
traceability from the farm. Furthermore we assume a 
linear  traceability  and  convex  food  safety  damage 
functions.  Since  the  objective  of  the  principal 
downstream  is  to  design  a  traceability  system  that 
reduces  totals  costs,  if  these  are  larger  than  the 
expected reduction of private damages the principal is 
better off without traceability.  
 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the choice of the optimal levels of traceability  
 
The  analysis  is  further  complicated  when  one 
considers other  links in the supply chain. The  more 
links involved and attributes that are traced, the more 
complex is the decision. Should the traceability level 
be the same regardless of the link or attribute to which 
it refers? Table 1  compares four different cases and 
provides  insight  into  this  question.  The  results  are    
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based  on  the  first  order  conditions  of  the  voluntary 
model of traceability. 
 
Table 1: Cases of voluntary traceability 
 
   
Farm to Processor 
 
Processor to Retailer 
Case 1 
1 1 D c γ ψ ′ < −  
2 2 D c γ ψ ′ < −  
Case 2 
1 1 D c γ ψ ′ < −  
2 2 D c γ ψ ′ ≥ −  
Case 3
§ 
1 1 D c γ ψ ′ ≥ −  
2 2 D c γ ψ ′ ≥ −  
Case 4
§§ 
1 1 D c γ ψ ′ ≥ −  
2 2 D c γ ψ ′ ≥ −  
§ The levels of traceability will be positive and equal across links when 
marginal damage mitigation and cost of traceability are equal across links 
§§ The levels of traceability will be positive but different across links when 
both the marginal damages and costs are different across links. 
Case  1  results  in  no  traceability.  It  is  based  on 
analysis  of  the  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  and 
corresponds to the corner solution scenario in figure 1. 
In the voluntary case, if the marginal impact of extra 
levels  of  traceability  in  terms  of  expected  damage 
mitigation is smaller than the marginal costs, then a 
rational  principal  should  not  implement  traceability. 
For  example,  this  could  be  the  case  where  more 
detailed information on the presence of a contaminant 
does not contribute to the reduction of the food safety 
damages it causes.  
In case 2, traceability is feasible for one of the links 
in  the  supply  chain.  This  is  the  link  for  which  the 
marginal  costs  of  traceability  equal  the  marginal 
partial expected damage mitigation costs. Suppose this 
is the link between the processor and the retailer. In 
this situation, the marginal costs of traceability for the 
farmer  are  larger  than  its  marginal  effect  on  the 
mitigation of expected food safety damages and it is 
not worth having traceability on this link.  
In case 3, traceability is feasible at every link of the 
supply  chain  and  the  same  levels  of  traceability 
emerge.  This  presumes  that  information  is  equally 
important, as it has the same costs and contributes in 
the same  manner to the  mitigation of damage costs, 
regardless of the link to which it refers. An example is 
traceability for a contaminant that persists along the 
supply chain (say a chemical component of food) and 
cannot be removed; the only way to assure its absence 
is by detecting it and keeping a record throughout the 
supply chain. 
Finally,  case  4  is  perhaps  the  most  realistic.  It 
illustrates the case  of a voluntary system that traces 
information  for  every  link  in  the  chain,  but  with 
differences in  levels  of traceability across links. For 
instance in beef supply chains each head of cattle may 
be traced from the feedlot to the slaughter house. In 
the next link, as animals are processed into beef cuts, 
precise traceability by the head may be replaced with 
lot traceability. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
This  paper  investigates  the  choice  of  voluntary 
traceability by firms in a food chain using a principal-
agent model. The principal is the downstream retailer 
that designs two independent contracts for traceability 
from  a  farm  and  a  processor  upstream.  Traceability 
reduces ex post damages of a food safety incident. Our 
results suggest that four cases may emerge. First no 
traceability will emerge if its marginal costs are larger 
than  the  benefits  to  the  retailer.  Partial  traceability 
occurs when only one link of the chain is chosen to be 
traceable, i.e., only in one link are the marginal costs 
of  traceability  equal  to  the  marginal  benefits  to  the 
retailer. Third the same level of traceability will occur 
at each link of the food chain if the marginal costs of 
traceability  and  the  partial  marginal  benefits  are  the 
same to each link of the chain. Finally, there will be 
different  levels  of  traceability  in  each  link  if  the 
marginal  costs  and  partial  marginal  benefits  are 
different for each upstream agent. 
Understanding  the  conditions  under  which 
voluntary  traceability  will  develop  is  important  to 
companies  and  government  agencies  in  making 
decisions on managing food safety risks. Traceability 
requirements  by  retailers  and  other  downstream 
participants in food supply chains may be resisted by 
some suppliers as overly burdensome. In other cases, 
governmental  authorities  may  conclude  that  private 
incentives to institute traceability are inadequate, for 
example  where  damages  in  the  case  of  food  safety 
failures  do  not  fall  fully  on  responsible  companies. 
Future  research  focusing  on  ex  post  analysis  of  the    
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development of voluntary traceability systems and on 
the  ex  ante  conditions  under  which  governments 
intervene to mandate traceability will lead to a better 
understanding of the economics of its adoption. 
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